Floor Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

October 13, 1999

Mr. President, it is with regret, after 25 years in this Chamber, a Chamber I love so much, that I say it is a travesty the Senate is on the verge of rejecting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban-Treaty. The idea of a treaty banning all nuclear tests has been around since President Dwight Eisenhower called for one more than 40 years ago when I was 19 years old.

Today, there is broad agreement around the world that a test ban treaty is necessary and, I point out to my colleagues, we have not conducted a nuclear test since President Bush signed legislation to establish a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992.

Mr. President, 152 nations have signed this treaty. They are abiding by its terms, but if we vote against its ratification, if we vote against advising and consenting, the Senate will abdicate our Nation's role as the world leader in support of nonproliferation. The 100 people in this body representing a quarter of a billion people will abdicate our Nation’s responsibility to ourselves and the world.

I am bewildered at the arguments made by some of my colleagues because the United States, which enjoys an immense global nuclear advantage over all other countries, will only find that position eroded if a global ban on testing is not realized.

Treaty opponents make two main arguments: that it is unverifiable and that the safety and reliability of our own weapons will be endangered without testing. In my judgment, both arguments fail miserably.

No treaty is 100% verifiable, and the fact is that any nation bent on developing a nuclear weapon can fashion a crude device, with or without this treaty. But without the explosive testing that this treaty prohibits, it will be extremely difficult to build nuclear weapons small enough to be mounted on delivery vehicles.

The critical question we should be asking is if this treaty will make it significantly harder for potential evaders to test nuclear weapons. The answer is a resounding yes. This treaty establishes a monitoring system that includes over 300 stations that will help locate the origin of a test. Last year, when India tested two nuclear devices simultaneously, the seismic waves that they created were recorded by 62 of these prototype stations.

Once a test has been detected, the treaty has a short-notice on-site inspection regime so questionable incidents can be resolved quickly. In short, the treaty makes it much more difficult for signatory nations to test nuclear weapons without alerting the international community and incurring their collective condemnation.

The argument that the CTBT will somehow undermine the safety and reliability of our own stockpile is likewise flawed. We have conducted over 1,000 nuclear tests during the last 54 years, the most of any country in the world. We have extensive knowledge of how to build and maintain nuclear weapons reliably. Moreover, the Clinton Administration is planning a 10 year, $45 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program that will develop unprecedented supercomputing simulations that will further ensure the continued reliability of our weapons.

I question whether we need to spend that much money, but I find it ironic that many of the voices who are questioning the technical merits of Stockpile Stewardship Program are the same people who want to spend tens of billions more on a National Missile Defense System that has shown modest technical progress, to say the least.

We have a treaty before us which will help curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should have been ratified years ago. I urge my colleagues to join me in setting aside short-term politics. Vote for the instrument of ratification. The Senate should be the conscience of our nation, the conscience of the world. If we vote this down, it is not.