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Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing On
"Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned From Enron’s Fall"
February 6, 2002
On November 8, Enron announced
that it had overstated earnings over the past four years by $586
million and was responsible for $3 billion in obligations that were
never reported to the public. Upon these disclosures, Enron stock fell
to $8.41 a share. Less than a month later Enron filed for bankruptcy
–– the largest corporate bankruptcy ever. Enron’s sudden
collapse left thousands of Enron investors holding virtually worthless
stock, and most Enron employees lost out. Those who profited appear to
be the senior officers and directors who cashed out while assuring
others that Enron was a solid investment, as well as the professionals
from accounting firms, law firms and business consulting firms, who
were paid millions to advise Enron on these practices.
How did this happen?
It appears that Enron, with the approval and advice
of its accountants, auditors and lawyers, used thousands of
off-the-book entities to overstate corporate profits, understate
corporate debts and inflate Enron’s stock price. Some Enron
executives ran these entities, reaped millions of dollars in salary
and stock options, and received conflict-of-interest waivers from
Enron’s Board of Directors.
With the help of these professionals, both inside
and outside of Enron, the company wove an elaborate web of corporate
deceit. This chart shows just a few of the secret Enron entities used
to hide debt, to fake profits and to inflate stocks. Being fanciful
was not limited to bookkeeping. Some of this same corporate
imagination was unleashed in naming these hidden Enron entities. Some
were named after Star Wars films characters–– Jedi, Obi, Kenobi
and Chewco (as in Chewbacca). Some were named after birds and fish
–– Condor, Egret, Peregrine, Blue Heron, Osprey, Dolphin and
Marlin. And some were named, perhaps the most aptly of all, after the
Wild West –– Rawhide, Ponderosa, Cactus, Mojave and Sundance.
Despite their different names, all these
Enron-related entities had one thing in common: They were never
honestly disclosed to the investing public. Much about these
partnerships is still secret, including who participated in them and
who benefitted from these corporate manipulations.
Enron’s web of deceit caught more than just its
employees. In addition to thousands of Enron employees losing their
life savings in the company’s 401(k) pension plan, many other
investors suffered losses because of sudden collapse of Enron’s
stock price. Across the nation, pension funds for union members,
teachers, government employees and other workers lost more than $1.5
billion from investments in Enron stock. State attorneys general,
individual investors and Enron employees have filed private class
action lawsuits against Enron executives, Arthur Andersen and others
for securities fraud to recover their losses. The Department of
Justice and the SEC are also investigating.
Enron’s web has also ensnared our financial
markets. Last week and again this week, the Dow Jones index fell
hundreds of points as doubts emerged about the trustworthiness of
balance sheets for other public companies that may have dabbled in
creative financing similar to Enron’s. With more than half of
Americans’ households invested in the stock market today, the
integrity of our financial markets is critical to the nation’s
economy.
During his State of the Union Address, President
Bush declared that "corporate America must be made more
accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest
standards of conduct." I agree with the President and hope that
this hearing and our work in this Committee and in the Senate can
contribute to increasing accountability.
Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay was questioned about the
use of off-the-book arrangements during a company e-mail chat on
September 26, 2001, and he assured Enron employees that he and Enron’s
Board of Directors "were convinced both by all of our internal
officers as well as our external auditor and counsel that they [the
off-the-book arrangements] were legal and totally appropriate."
Mr. Lay’s accountability remains to be seen.
Having said for weeks that he would testify before the Senate, he
abruptly cancelled his appearance on Monday. Except for his part in a
carefully orchestrated media campaign, he is not talking. No one has
been able to get him to answer questions that test the accuracy of his
statements from last fall, just before the fall of Enron. Nor have Mr.
Skilling or Mr. Fastow, or several others, yet testified. Tragically,
one senior Enron executive has apparently taken his own life.
What we do know is that the actions of Enron’s
professional advisors raise serious ethical questions for the legal
and accounting professions and questions of professional
accountability.
The actions of Enron and its advisors also raise
serious questions about the current legal environment –– where
auditors and outside counsel enjoy special legal protections forced
through Congress in the 1990s. Whether this legal environment serves
to encourage lax corporate governance, questionable accounting and
undisciplined legal practices are among the questions we explore
today.
A 5 to 4 majority decision of the United States
Supreme Court gave accountants and lawyers a big break from liability
in private securities fraud actions in 1994. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and O’Connor overturned decades
of well-settled law that allowed private fraud suits against a person,
such as an auditor or attorney, who aids and abets the principal in
accomplishing the fraud.
Aiding and abetting liability is especially
important in securities fraud cases. First, it provides incentives for
accountants and lawyers to police corporate fraud and helps overcome
the profit incentive that can otherwise motivate complicity in
questionable conduct. Second, as the Enron experience shows all too
well, securities fraud schemes are often very complex. The assistance
of experts and professionals is necessary to carry out fraud in
complicated schemes. Instead of setting up huge financial incentives
for these experts to assist in structuring corporate fraud, our laws
must enlist the assistance of these professionals as guardians of the
honesty of our corporate financial disclosures. They should be helping
stop fraud before it causes harm to the public and undercuts public
confidence in the transparency and honesty of our markets.
The Supreme Court was not alone in chipping away at
legal protection for investors and creating an environment in which
creative accounting can morph into off-the-books maneuvering that is
destroying pensions and savings and threatens to cut the heart out of
investor confidence. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act –– over President Clinton’s veto. This
version of "reform" contributed to the loss of professional
discipline and enacted restrictions making it more difficult for the
victims of securities fraud to bring civil actions and recover their
losses.
This legislation prevents a defrauded investor from
using the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
and its remedies in almost all securities fraud cases. Securities
fraud is the only exemption to our civil RICO laws. I recall that
Senator Specter and I, along with other members of the committee,
voted against the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act when it was
on the floor of the Senate and warned that its special legal
protections might lead to future financial scandals. Beginning with
Enron, the chickens have come home to roost.
No matter if you voted for or against the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, no Member of Congress intended for
it to be used to promote corporate greed. We cannot legislate against
greed but we can and should do what is possible to prevent greed from
prevailing.
In fact, the accounting industry liked the special
legal protections in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act so
much that Andersen Worldwide made a trophy out of the conference
report by shrinking it and encasing it in plastic. What the law did
was shrink the rights and protections of American investors. Well, at
least you can’t shred it.
There were contributions to this disaster, large and
small, from the corporate officers and directors whose actions led to
Enron’s failure, from the well-paid professionals who helped create
and carry out the complicated corporate ruse when they should have
been raising concerns, from the regulators who did not protect the
public and our public markets, from Congress and from the courts. Now
we must contribute to making the Enron situation right and making sure
that this does not happen again. This travesty will be compounded if
we do not now learn from it and try to prevent it from happening
again. Unfortunately, as we were reminded again during the savings and
loan failures of the 1980s, without discipline, professionalism, an
effective legal structure, and accountability, greed can run rampant,
with devastating results. And unfortunately, business failures during
a permissive era rarely happen in isolation.
Congress can do more to make sure that our laws help
deter corporate fraud and we should help defrauded investors to recoup
their losses. In fact, by forcing through special exemptions for
securities fraud, accountants and others made Congress a contributor
to the Wild West mentality that came to be reflected in Enron’s
hidden partnerships. The time has come for Congress to re-think and
reform our laws in the other direction in order to prevent corporate
deceit, to protect investors and to restore full confidence in the
capital markets.
I should also comment briefly on the relevance of
the Enron bankruptcy to bankruptcy reform legislation that is now in
conference between the House and Senate. I recently received a letter
from 35 law school professors regarding Section 912 of both the
House-passed and Senate-passed bankruptcy reform bills. This section
amends the Bankruptcy Code to provide a safe harbor from bankruptcy
court review for certain asset-backed securitizations –– a type of
complex, off-the-books financial transaction. These bankruptcy experts
believe that the provision "would encourage more companies to
recast liabilities so that they no longer appear on balance sheets,
much to the detriment of the investing public and other creditors of
the business." I have asked the Department of Justice for its
views on this controversial provision in light of the Enron matter and
intend to work with the other conferees to get this matter right.
I am also concerned that Enron executives who made
millions of dollars in sweetheart corporate deals could abuse Texas’s
unlimited bankruptcy homestead exemption by shielding any unjust
enrichment from defrauded investors. Last week on national television,
the wife of Enron’s former Chairman and former CEO, disclosed that
her husband is considering filing for bankruptcy protection. Under
Texas law there are no limits on the dollar amount that debtors may
plow in their personal residences and then shield from creditors in
bankruptcy. The Enron demise underscores the need for Congress to
enact a nationwide cap on homestead exemptions, such as the cap that
Senator Kohl and Senator Feinstein authored in the Senate-passed
bankruptcy reform bill.
Accountability and transparency help our markets
work as they should, in ways that benefit investors, employees,
consumers and our national economy. The Enron experience has arrived
on our doorstep, and our job is to make sure that there are adequate
doses of accountability in our legal system to prevent such debacles
in the future, and to offer a constructive remedy if there are not.
I look forward to the comments and questions of the
Senators participating today and to hearing from our panel of
witnesses. I will introduce them after we hear from our distinguished
Ranking Republican Member, Senator Hatch.
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