Floor Debate On The Leahy Amendment To The Iraq Supplemental
October 2, 2003

Below is the full Senate debate on the Leahy Amendment (to the Iraq supplemental appropriations bill, from last Thursday) that would require Ambassador Bremer to report to the Secretary of State, instead of to the Secretary of Defense, as is currently the case.  We now know that at the very moment the Senate was debating the amendment, the Administration in fact was in the process of creating a new NSC entity and new lines of authority.  These developments again beg the questions put to the Senate by Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) --

(1)  Senators Leahy and Daschle argue that the status quo in Iraq, with respect to reconstruction efforts, is not working and must change.  Republican Senators Warner and Allard countered during the debate that the status quo was working well.  Sen. Warner says “there is enormous momentum” and Senator Allard says, “I think things are going well in Iraq.  Certainly, I have no qualms with the way the State Department and the Defense Department are working together.  I do not think we ought to upset the apple cart when things are moving in the right direction.”  The State Department letter opposing the amendment also makes the same point.    

Yet the very day of this debate , the Administration itself (on Oct. 2, according to press reports) was making fundamental changes to the structure of the Iraq program, effectively moving more control from DoD to the NSC.  

(2)  Since the “momentum” argument proffered by Senate Republicans has now been debunked by the Administration’s own actions, wouldn’t it be better to move more control of the Iraq reconstruction effort to the State Department, as Senators Leahy and Daschle argue, instead of to the NSC? 

(a) The NSC is not an “operational agency,” equipped to oversee large reconstruction programs.  The State Department has been in charge of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict situations for the past 50 years (even in Vietnam, during a full-blown war, State and USAID handled most of the aid distribution). 

(b) In a reconstruction effort plagued by lack of transparency, the Administration is moving more control of these efforts to the NSC – an office of the President that is beyond the oversight of the Congress.  This, in stark contrast to the State Department, whose principal officers are confirmed by the Senate and have some accountability to the Congress. 

(c) Why create a  new bureaucratic entity to handle Iraq reconstruction?  Why not streamline the process by putting where it has always been, under the direct control of the Secretary of State?

The debate (from the Congressional Record) follows:

DEBATE AMONG SENATORS PATRICK LEAHY (D-VT), JOHN WARNER (R-VA), WAYNE ALLARD (R-CO), AND TOM DASCHLE (D-SD)
THE LEAHY AMENDMENT TO PLACE THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCTOBER 2, 2003
(STARTS ON PAGE S12339 OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD)

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.  The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. LEAHY] for himself, Mr. Daschle, and Mr. Biden, proposes an amendment numbered 1803.

On page 25, line 21, before the colon, insert the following:

: Provided further, That beginning not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. That is why I didn't follow the usual procedure where amendments are simply deemed read. This was a short enough one that I wanted it read.

It does what many of us feel we should have done 5 months ago when we appropriated the first $2.5 billion in foreign aid for Iraq. At the time we gave that very substantial amount of foreign aid to Iraq, many of us urged the Secretary of State--not the Secretary of Defense--should have authority over the reconstruction program.

No matter who is Secretary of State, no matter who is Secretary of Defense, when you are going to give enormous amounts of foreign aid for reconstruction, the aid should be under the Department of State. After all, foreign aid is the responsibility of the State Department.  Also, it is the responsibility of USAID. That is what they know how to do. That is what their people are trained to do.

It is not what the Pentagon does, nor, for that matter, is it what the Pentagon should be doing. The Pentagon is trained in military combat. In fact, our forces, the men and women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, are the best trained, the best equipped, best motivated of any military in the world. Obviously, they showed they can easily defeat other military forces as they did in Iraq.

While they are trained for war, the State Department is trained to work to rebuild. In this case, as superb as the military role was, their leadership disregarded the preparatory work the State Department and USAID had done in planning for after the war. The problems they now face reflect that.  I am concerned we are putting our men and women in the military in an impossible situation. They are being asked not only to provide security, but to also oversee the reconstruction.

I have a lot of respect for Ambassador Bremer. I have known him and worked with him on terrorism and other matters over the years. He did a good job last week when he testified before the Appropriations Committee. Like a lawyer arguing the brief for his client, he argued well. But Ambassador Bremer's office, which is located in the Pentagon, until very recently was not capable of responding to our questions. The questions we were asking were not how many divisions might move here or how many tanks, airplanes, helicopters, men and women under arms can move, but, rather, how can we do a better job of getting water, and electricity, and other aid to the Iraqi people?

We saw the reconstruction plan, apparently a Pentagon plan, an 8-page document. When it came out a couple months ago, none of us on this side of aisle received it.  Now that we have seen it, I understand why they didn't want everyone to have it. It is embarrassingly illustrative of the administration's postwar strategy. There was no postwar strategy. All the strategy led up to winning in Iraq. Everyone knew how that would come out. Of course we would defeat the broken Iraqi army. Everyone knew we were going to win. This was not World War II. But, amazingly enough, there was no strategy for what happened after we won.

I am not among those who believe everything we have done in Iraq has been a failure. There has been progress. For one thing, I am glad Saddam Hussein is not here. He was a murderous tyrant. Members of the administration now talk about the murderous conduct of Saddam Hussein when he used chemical weapons against the Kurds--something many Members were outraged about at the time--and they seem to forget the administration they served at that time turned a blind eye to that and continued to give aid to Saddam Hussein.

Having said that, now I think everyone, whether those in the Congress or the administration who supported Saddam Hussein over the years, we all agree--all Republicans, all Democrats agree--he was a tyrant and it is good he is gone. That is progress.

We have begun to train a new army and police force and so on. That is progress. But we were told this spring that the amount of money for the aid program would be very small. Now we are asked to increase our aid program ten fold, with virtually no controls on how the money will be spent.

So, we got into the war, we had no plan for what we would do afterwards, we have real problems now, and now they want a blank check to take care of it. We will pay $33,000 each for pickup trucks that sell for $14,000 here, and we will pay $6,000 for telephones you can buy in the neighboring country of Jordan for $500 or $600. We will pay $50,000 a bed for a prison although that is far more than we would in the United States. We will repair their power infrastructure although we do not have money to do the same in the United States. We will build a whole lot of new schoolhouses although we do not have the money to fix our dilapidated schools. We will build state-of-the-art hospitals even though we do not have the money for new health clinics in parts of the United States. And we are told: Just give us the money and trust us; we know what to do.

In my State, we do not sign blank checks. I am sure we will give money for foreign aid even though we do not have the money to do the same things in the United States.

Simply spending more money does not get us back on track. We need a real plan, and we need the right agency in charge. That is why this amendment is so short. It is one sentence. It simply puts the Coalition Provisional Authority--and I assume that will be Ambassador Bremer although I am not doing this on an ad hominem basis--simply put the coalition provisional authority, Ambassador Bremer, who has been working around the clock to carry out our interests there, under the foreign policy guidance and direction of the Secretary of State. It would provide 60 days after enactment to give the State Department time to put in place the people it needs.

Does that mean the Department of Defense no longer has any role in reconstruction? Of course not. They obviously will be consulted on a continuous basis. Everyone knows nothing can be built unless there is security to prevent attacks on contractors and aid workers and to prevent sabotage to the projects themselves. We are fortunate to have a superb military there to provide that kind of security. But that is what the Defense Department should be doing, providing the security but not trying to oversee foreign aid projects. That is not what they are trained to do.

It is unfair to our men and women in the military to ask them to do that. It was a mistake in the first place when we asked them to do it. We should not repeat that. Let us not ask the Department of Defense to suddenly become the State Department, AID, and the general dispenser of foreign aid. They are so well trained to do the things they do. Let those who are trained to handle foreign aid and the projects of reconstruction be there.

It is also worth noting, when you look at the civil affairs units in the Defense Department, almost all of them are composed of National Guard and Reserve units. Ironically, to the extent you are going to use the military for the nation building we are doing in Iraq--we are doing nation building in Afghanistan, and Lord knows where else--these are the men and women in uniform who are best equipped for the nation building we are doing in Iraq.

So we either have to keep these National Guard and Reserve forces in Iraq indefinitely--and I think the majority of the Members of both parties here do not want to see that happen--or we have to get the State Department and USAID more involved in doing nation building. I favor the latter approach. That is what my amendment would do.  I do not think we should continue to rely on these National Guard and Reserve units to do the long-term development work that should be done by others. Let that be done by the Department of State and AID, and let the Department of Defense provide the security for those who are doing the reconstruction in Iraq.

Some might ask if the Secretary of State wants that authority, given what a thankless job it is becoming in Iraq. I do not know. If he gets the authority, I will offer him not congratulations but condolences.

I see my dear friend.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, might I answer my colleague's very insightful question as to what the Secretary of State has in mind.

I have just been in consultation with his office, upon learning of my distinguished colleague's amendment. Very shortly there will be a written communication coming to the leadership of the Senate expressing, without any equivocation, that he feels strongly that the Department of State, at this time, should not be given the responsibility. But there will come a time, I say to my distinguished colleague--an appropriate time, and perhaps without further interruption to your opening remarks--I could engage the Senator in a colloquy to discuss perhaps an alternative measure at some future time.

Basically, it would be after the Iraqi Government is in place and the United States would, at that time, indicate an individual to become the U.S. Ambassador, at which time there could be an orderly transition from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.

My concern, I say to my friend, is that it has taken Ambassador Bremer some 3 months now to gain the momentum he has. We have a critical issue before this body at the very moment of whether or not the additional funds will hopefully immediately be forthcoming. That decision will be finally made next week. I strongly support it, to continue that momentum. A shift at this time would result in loss of momentum.

I conclude my few remarks at this moment by saying, throughout the testimony and private discussions with Ambassador Bremer, which I am sure my colleague from Vermont has had, he has constantly said that the danger to the coalition forces--that danger being indelibly impressed on us every day with the announcement of a loss or an injury to members of the uniformed services, and indeed others--David Kay is, at this moment, before committees of the Congress. In conversations with me, he has expressed the danger to his operation daily by their transit down these motorways and otherwise.

The direct correlation of reducing the danger to our troops, to the Iraqi special survey group headed by David Kay, and to others performing NGO operations--this whole panoply of people--there is a direct correlation between the speed and the momentum that the Bremer operation has brought up to replace the infrastructure and the lessening of the personal risks to individuals.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Virginia is not only one of the best friends I have in this place, and has been for the years that we have served together, but I also know he is one of the hardest working Members of the Senate.

As I mentioned earlier in my opening statement, I am not suggesting for a minute that Ambassador Bremer, for whom I have high regard, be replaced. I am simply saying that it is not a question of whether the Secretary of State should take this now or later; the fact is, this is his job. He should have been doing it from the beginning. We are not changing horses in midstream.

Incidentally, speaking of Mr. Kay and others, I also stated, prior to the Senator from Virginia coming to the floor, that, of course, the military would have to stay and provide the security so these people can continue to work. I am just saying, insofar as we are doing nation building, let it be done by the State Department, as we always have, and not think that somehow we can go solely as a military authority and then have this country suddenly, one day, become a democratic nation, and only then will we bring in the State Department to give aid.

I have looked at the plan. The plan said it was to give the Iraqi people the opportunity to realize President Bush's vision. We may want to ask them if that is exactly the vision they want. But be that as it may, this is not changing horses in midstream. We are getting on the right horse, in fact, the horse that has taken us across the stream for the last 50 years.  Every major postwar reconstruction effort since the Marshall plan has been under the auspices of the Secretary of State, not the Secretary of Defense: Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, Cambodia. Even during the middle of the Vietnam war, economic aid was handled by AID.

I am thinking of an article on July 24, referring to an assessment by outside experts, commissioned by the Pentagon, who warned that the window of opportunity for postwar success is closing. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that: After initial deals for reconstruction stalled, it was time for plan B but there was no plan B.

I would hope the plan B that was written on July 23 is not it. I have a plan B. It is called the Secretary of State. Put the Department of State in charge of the reconstruction. Not the military part, of course. The military is going to be there for some substantial period of time--we know this--but allow them to do the things they are good at. They are not trained, nor should they be, to become a governing power, to become nation builders.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could probe my colleague, as I read this, it states very clearly:

   Provided further, That beginning not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

As I indicated, the Secretary is very much opposed to this amendment. We will very shortly have that evidence before the Senate. But it is clear from the reading of this that the $21 billion which is before this body right now as a part of the 87--and it remains a part; that issue has been addressed--would now be transferred to the Department of State for, frankly, writing all the checks, working on the allocation of priorities, the coordination with the military structure under the Secretary of Defense and General Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander. The whole thing is lifted and put under the State Department in 60 days after this, should it be enacted. Am I not correct?

Mr. LEAHY. No, the Senator is not correct. The implication is that somehow my amendment would put everything under the State Department. We are being asked to provide over $80 billion. Roughly three-quarters of that goes to the Department of Defense. Nobody is asking anybody but the Department of Defense to handle it. We are saying the $20 million of foreign aid--one of the largest foreign aid packages I have ever seen--the $20 billion of foreign aid that is brand new would be overseen by the State Department. We want to make sure that the Iraqis do not feel this is a long-term military operation.

People should know, my amendment doesn't stop the President from allocating and reallocating reconstruction funds to any agency, including Defense, but State would have oversight of that. It doesn't shut down the Coalition Provisional Authority. It doesn't require big changes there.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator be more explicit?

Mr. LEAHY. As I have said before, I am glad Ambassador Bremer is there. It doesn't micromanage the reconstruction effort. It doesn't create a disruption of any of the programs that are there. But it does say when we want to ask how these aid programs and reconstruction programs are going, we ask the questions of our State Department, the Department that has had this responsibility and expertise, and the Department that has always done this from the days of the Marshall plan on.

My friends keep saying, this is just like the Marshall plan. Well, there are some big differences. One, the Marshall plan didn't ask us to pick up the whole tab as this does. That was a dollar-for-dollar match. Some of it was in loans. It wasn't done immediately after the war. It took many hearings, hundreds of witnesses. And then working with the President, there was a congressional oversight committee that actually had input from both parties, both Republicans and Democrats, unlike the situation here with the 8 page plan that we were given two months late.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator would enable me to bring to the attention of the Senate a communication at this point in time from the Department of State, it might be helpful. As I read the amendment, it is clear to me that Bremer would now report to the Secretary of State.

Mr. LEAHY. That is true.

Mr. WARNER. There is no provision that he continues a direct chain to the Secretary of Defense. That structure, from Bremer right on down through his organization, would now be reporting to the Secretary of State. Am I correct in that?

Mr. LEAHY. Yes, but it does not shut down or require changes in the central command. It doesn't require any military to report to the Secretary of State.

Mr. WARNER. The Senator has made that eminently clear. I think right now we are looking at the coalition operation under Bremer now being transferred in its entirety and reporting to the Secretary of State. That organization, under Bremer at the present time, composes, indeed, contributions of a number of personnel from the Departments of State and Defense. It is sort of a coalition within itself of our Federal departments and agencies. Our coalition partners, primarily Great Britain, are integral participants.

How would they feel if suddenly they awakened and determined that no longer does their deputy to Bremer from Great Britain report to the Secretary of State? This is a very significant and major change that our distinguished colleague is proposing.  In response, the Department of State, through its Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, addressed our colleagues in the Senate by saying the following:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Senator Leahy's proposed amendment to the FY 2004 Supplemental that would transfer control of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. While we appreciate Senator Leahy's confidence in the State Department, we are opposed to the amendment.

That is very clear and unequivocal.

The decision to establish control of Iraq’s reconstruction through the Department of Defense was made because military operations were and are ongoing in Iraq. The immediate objective was to establish a secure and safe environment in Iraq. Restoring basic services and creating conditions for economic growth could not take place until this environment was established.

For unity of effort and command, it was judged--and this judgment was from the President on down--

the Department of Defense would be the most appropriate department in which to place CPA. The State Department fully expects to resume control of traditional development efforts in Iraq once the security situation is fully stabilized and an elected government is in place.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on Senator Leahy's amendment. We will be pleased to provide any additional information you might require.

I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

   “U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

   Washington, DC.

   DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCONNELL: Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Senator Leahy's proposed amendment to the FY 2004 Supplemental that would transfer control of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. While we appreciate Senator Leahy's confidence in the State Department, we are opposed to the amendment.

   The decision to establish control of Iraq’s reconstruction through the Department of Defense was made because military operations were and are ongoing in Iraq. The immediate objective was to establish a secure and safe environment in Iraq. Restoring basic services and creating conditions for economic growth could not take place until this environment was established.

   For unity of effort and command, it was judged the Department of Defense would be the most appropriate department in which to place the CPA. The State Department fully expects to resume control of traditional development efforts in Iraq once the security situation is fully stabilized and an elected government is in place.

   Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on Senator Leahy's amendment. We will be pleased to provide any additional information you might require.

   Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,

   Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs. “

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I also see what the National Security Adviser said, and I quote:

   The President must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.

Dr. Rice said that.

The Washington Post reports that the diplomats on Ambassador Bremer's staff in Baghdad report directly to him, not to Washington, which is true. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has told the press he has to rely on newspapers and the diplomatic reports of other nations to keep abreast of developments in Iraq. Maybe they don't like the job, but that is what the State Department is designed to do. I have had times when somebody said I had to sit in this hearing for 4 hours because I was either chairman or ranking member of the committee, and I said, I don't want to, I would rather go to Vermont, or I would rather go hunting on my farm, or do other things. But you know what? It is my job, it is a job I was elected to do, and I have done it.

I am sorry if the State Department feels they don't need to do their job. Maybe they have too many people. Maybe we are spending money we don't need to there. I mean, this is what they do in Afghanistan. This is the role they have played in every post-war situation since the Marshall plan.

I ask, what is so different about Iraq? Suddenly, we are breaking 50 years of precedent and they don't want to do what they are supposed to do. I am worried, why don't they want to do their job? Are they concerned that they could not do it better than it is being done now? I would hope they could, or else we are spending an awful lot of money at the State Department that we don't need to spend.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in response to my colleague, the Marshall plan is, in clear terms, a precedent for what the policy decisions of our country are, as embraced in the request for this $21 billion and in the future. But there is a clear distinction. The Marshall plan came in years after the fighting had stopped. As you and I are now in this colloquy on the floor of the Senate, that fighting is going on right now--hundreds of thousands of coalition forces--over a hundred thousand--and many civilians are subjected to the constant threat by this polyglot of former Baathists, former associates of Saddam Hussein, terrorists are moving in.

This is a tough situation and there is daily communication between Ambassador Bremer and the military.  They have worked side by side. In fact, you visited there, as I have. Their offices are just across the hall from one another.

Mr. LEAHY. If I may respond on that, as I have stated over and over again--and I will state it again for my good friend, who I refer to as “my Senator” when I am away from Vermont because I live part of the time in his beautiful Commonwealth. We are not asking the military to not do the job they do, and do well; we are not asking that they stop providing security or to not continue to hunt for Saddam Hussein or those connected with him. What I am saying is that they ought to be freed up to do that job. But they should not be doing the nation building the administration wants, which is our President's vision for Iraq. Let's give that job back to the people who are trained to do it.

I know the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee does not want to see our military there forever as an occupying force. He and I totally agree on that. He and I totally agree that our military is the finest in the world, and they have done extraordinarily well there. I think we have them stretched pretty thin in a lot of areas

I am saying, let the military do the military work; let the State Department do the foreign aid work; and if the State Department is unwilling to do the kinds of things they are trained for, which they tell us year after year they need hundreds of millions of dollars more to do, then maybe we don't need them.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might address the comment about letting the State Department do its traditional responsibilities, I am referring to testimony before the House of Representatives on September 30, when the Deputy Secretary of State, Secretary Armitage, appeared. He made the following observations. He said that Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Powell speak to each other on the phone occasionally but they e-mail each other if not every day, pretty close to that.

He was asked what the role is in postwar Iraq. He said: We have 42 officers there now--42 State Department officers. I don't want to make light of it. Both Ambassador Bremer and his second, Clay McManaway, are both State officers. The guy who is running the show with the railroad is Pat Kennedy, one of the administration officers. So the State Department is heavily involved at the current time. The other officers from the Department of State are spread out not only in I&L but we have Mike Felia down in the southeastern region working with the Shia. We have others with the Kurds.

Ambassador Bremer has asked us to come forward with another approximately 60 officers and that we will be able to fill many more of these provinces with State Department officers, the high majority of which will be there with three or four language-speaking capabilities.

I say to my colleague, there is the closest of relationships with the Secretaries of State and Defense and directly between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Bremer. As he points out very clearly here, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and the principal deputy to Ambassador Bremer are now officers on loan from the Secretary of State to the CPA. I urge my colleagues who are following this debate to think for themselves about the consequences of the loss of reconstruction that this would entail. You cannot make the shift in that point of time, and, to me, it would bring a greater threat personally and endangerment to the life and limb of not only the coalition forces in uniform but thousands of civilians who are working in various capacities to bring about the goals of peace and turning over this nation to the Iraqi people.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am getting the impression that my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Virginia, is not in agreement with my amendment and would like to keep the status quo, at least for now.

I respond that the current structure has not worked well. Between the two of us, we have a half century of listening to people testify. The Pentagon has said over and over again--certainly in a lot of the hearings I have had and I am sure that the Senator from Virginia has had--that they are not a foreign aid agency. The Pentagon is not a foreign aid agency.

I think the experience of the past 5 months in Iraq confirms that. They came in there without a plan, a postwar plan. I believe they miscalculated terribly and they put our soldiers in a vulnerable position.

I yield to nobody in this body in my admiration of the men and women who are in Iraq, the members of our military, but the administration put them in an untenable position. They have to maintain order, fight terrorists, build schools and sewer systems, and do all that simultaneously. Let the military and the Secretary of Defense focus on fighting the war and leave foreign aid to the agencies with the expertise.

Just this week, one of our national news magazines said:

   “On the ground, the Coalition Provisional Authority, charged with actually running Iraq until the Iraqis can take over, is the source of increasing ridicule . . . So there they are, sitting in their palace: 800 people, 17 of whom speak Arabic, one is an expert on Iraq. Living in this cocoon. Writing papers. ``It's absurd,'' says one dissident Pentagon official. He exaggerates, but not by much. Most of the senior civilian staff are not technical experts. ..... “

Time magazine says Joe Fillmore, a contract translator with the 4th Infantry Division in Tikrit, agrees that resentment is deep. ``Things may look better on the surface,'' he says, ``but there is growing frustration with the occupation. The town is dividing into two parts: those who hate us, and those who don't mind us, but want us to go.''

Whether one was for or against war, we are now there. But when we are asked to buy enormously expensive items, to spend more money to build a hospital in Iraq than we would spend on a hospital in Vermont, when we are asked to spend more money on telecommunications in Iraq than we are willing to spend in many states in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money on the electrical infrastructure in Iraq than we are willing to spend here, when we are asked to spend more money to put people back to work in Iraq than we are willing to spend in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money for police and security and prisons in Iraq than we are willing to spend where it is needed in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money for vehicles in Iraq than we spend for vehicles in the United States, I think it is fair we ask is this right? Is this necessary? Maybe it is time to put the right people in charge.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might again bring to my colleague's attention the momentum that is presently in the CPA and its achievements. CPA is providing funds through military commanders--I want to point that out--military commanders in the field, coalition military commanders to fund projects at the village and municipal level. Approximately $24 million has been spent on over 6,200 projects to date.

Health projects: Saddam Hussein budgeted $13 million for health care in 2002, approximately 50 cents per person. For the second half of 2003, CPA allocated $211 million--I repeat, $211 million--a 3,200 percent increase in health care.

On April 9, only 30 percent of Iraqi hospitals were functioning. CPA is bringing the health care system back to life. Now all 240 hospitals in Iraq are up and running. The CPA has wiped away the old corrupt system for distributing medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. In the past 90 days, 9,000 tons of medical supplies have been delivered, an increase of 700 percent. Because of the CPA, Iraqi children have received 22 million doses of vaccine to cover over 4 million children and nearly a million pregnant women.

Education: Saddam starved the country's schools of cash for more than 20 years. Children were taught pro-regime slogans in classrooms little better than livestock sheds. Enrollment in some areas had dropped to 50 percent of eligible children.

CPA is refurbishing more than 1,000 schools. The schools will have new plumbing instead of raw sewage in the playgrounds, fresh paint, blackboards, pencils, and teaching equipment.

Justice system: Nationwide, 90 percent of the courts are up and running. Criminal courts in Baghdad reopened in May. A central criminal court made up of specially vetted judges and prosecutors has been established to try cases in public. The first trial was held August 25.

I could go on and on. I ask unanimous consent to print these success stories in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Coalition Provisional Authority]

   Iraq Success Stories

   Reconstruction Projects

   CPA is providing funds through military commanders in the field to fund projects at the village and municipal level. Approximately $24 million has been spent on over 6,200 projects to date.

   Health Projects

   Saddam Hussein budgeted $13 million for healthcare in 2002, approximately 50 cents per person. For the second half of 2003, CPA allocated $211 million, a 3200% increase.

   On April 9th only 30 percent of Iraqi hospitals were functioning. CPA is bringing the healthcare system back to life. Now, all 240 hospitals in Iraq are up and running.

   The CPA has wiped away the old corrupt system for distributing medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. In the past 90 days 9000 tons of medical supplies have been delivered; an increase of 700 percent.

   Because of the CPA, Iraqi children have received 22.3 million doses of vaccine to cover over 4 million children and nearly a million pregnant women.

   Education

   Saddam starved the country's schools of cash for more than 20 years. Children were taught pro-regime slogans in classrooms little better than livestock sheds. Enrollment in some areas had dropped to 50% of eligible children.

   The CPA is refurbishing more than 1000 schools. The schools will have new plumbing instead of raw sewage in the playgrounds, fresh paint, blackboards, pencils, and teaching equipment.

   Justice System

   Nationwide, 90% of courts are up and running. Criminal courts in Baghdad re-opened in May.

   A Central Criminal Court made up of specially vetted judges and prosecutors, has been established to try cases in public. The first trial was held on August 25th.

   Odious legal provisions inconsistent with fundamental human rights have been suspended. Criminal defendants now have the right to defense counsel at all stages of proceedings, the right against self-incrimination, the right to be informed of these rights, and the exclusion of evidence obtained by torture.

   Eight Supreme Court Justices wrongfully removed by Saddam Hussein have been reinstated.

   Judge Dara Noor al-Din, who was imprisoned for holding one of Saddam's decrees unconstitutional, is now a member of the Governing Council, in addition to his judicial duties. He was never a Ba'athist.

   Judge Medhat Mahmood, was never a Ba'athist, has been named Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Mr. WARNER. There is enormous momentum.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, when I hear this glowing description, I wonder why the administration is asking for another $20 billion. I wish most of the States in the United States were doing as well as what the Senator from Virginia has described.  If they are doing that well, maybe we should give the $20 billion to States in the United States that are not doing nearly as well and could probably use the money.

I am glad to hear the hospitals are all operating again. Obviously, from a humanitarian point of view that is important progress. I hope the Iraqis realize they can go to any hospital they want now and they will receive the help they need. If that is true, why do we need to spend another $150 million for another hospital? Rural hospitals throughout the 50 States of the United States cannot say that. I know a lot of places in the 50 States in the United States about which we cannot give the kind of glowing report the Senator from Virginia has given about Iraq.

Keep in mind, I am not asking for somebody to walk in there tomorrow and take over. But I would hope that within the next two months, with the 800 people in the palace over there, we might find more than 17 who can speak Arabic. That, I think, would be the kind of expertise the State Department could bring.

I hope we will have more than one expert on Iraq, and I hope we will tell the Iraqi people that we are as interested in them building their country following their vision and not, in almost a condescending way, saying we want them to have the opportunity to build a country that fits the vision our President has for them. After all, we are talking about a civilization that goes back long before this country was even discovered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I recognize that important bit of history. As I say to my friend of a quarter of century, we have had the privilege of serving here--and I see the distinguished acting minority leader on the floor--it would be the intention of the Senator from Virginia to move to table, but I first would like to hear an expression perhaps from others who might like to address the amendment.

Mr. REID. If the Senator from Virginia will yield.

…….….. (A procedural discussion takes place)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand our side is going to move to table the Leahy amendment, and I do support tabling the Leahy amendment. From what I have been able to observe,

I think things are going well in Iraq. Certainly, I have no qualms with the way the State Department and the Defense Department are working together. I do not think we ought to upset the apple cart when things are moving in the right direction.

………… (Sen. Allard and other Senators continue to speak on topics unrelated to the Leahy amendment)

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Leahy amendment.

The amendment is very straightforward. It puts the State Department in charge of reconstruction of Iraq. It says that we ought to relieve our military of the burden of running this nationbuilding program, and we ought to put it in the hands of the U.S. Government agency that has successfully run such programs for decades.

The President recognized the wisdom of such a decision last fall when he directed the State Department to conduct its year-long study called ``The Future of Iraq.'' The study apparently cost $5 million. It convened countless meetings with independent experts on Iraq and on post-conflict reconstruction. And, unfortunately, the study's findings were completely ignored.

According to a remarkable story in this week's Newsweek, when it came time to send the reconstruction team into Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the State Department expert who had spent the previous year preparing the United States Government for post-Saddam Iraq to stay home. Apparently, his absence meant something. Another member of the reconstruction team who did go to Iraq came home about a month later and wrote a remarkable article for the Washington Post. He offered a series of stories about his time in Iraq to demonstrate ``how flawed policy and incompetent administration have marred the follow-up to the brilliant military campaign to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime.''  Unfortunately, the civilian leadership continues to rely on overly rosey scenarios and unrealistic plans while the risk to our troops grows.

Last week, we were presented a plan by Ambassador Bremer that was supposed to set everything right in the reconstruction effort. His plan lays out five security goals--which are to be completed by October. Let me walk through just three of them.

The Bremer plan will ``locate, secure, and eliminate WMD capability.'' Yet, today the lead man on the search for weapons of mass destruction was to brief Congress on his efforts to date. According to press reports, he will report that he has not found any unconventional weapons.

The Bremer plan will also ``eliminate munitions caches, unexploded ordinance and excess military equipment.'' Yet the New York Times reported last weekend that 650,000 tons of ammunition remains at thousands of sites used by the former Iraqi security forces, and that much of it has not been secured and will take years to destroy.

The Bremer plan will also ``defeat internal armed threats'' by October. Just today in Iraq, our commanding general on the ground in Iraq, said that our troops are facing increasingly sophisticated attacks and it would take years before Iraq could maintain internal security without backup.

The Leahy amendment simply says that we have had enough of unrealistic plans and inexperienced planners. It says we are not comfortable that our troops--overstretched and at risk--are being forced to lead the nationbuilding effort in Iraq. It says what every independent assessment of our Iraq effort has urged us to do: put the experienced reconstruction experts at the State Department--not our military--in charge of nationbuilding.

I urge my colleagues to support the Leahy amendment, and I yield the floor.

   Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am informed it will now be possible to yield back all the time on the Leahy amendment. The distinguished Senator from Vermont is here in the Chamber.

   I yield any remaining time on our side on the Leahy amendment.

   Mr. LEAHY. I yield our time.

   Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to table the Leahy amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.

[THE LEAHY AMENDMENT WAS TABLED IN A VOTE OF 56 TO 42, ON THE MOTION TO TABLE.  ALL REPUBLICAN SENATORS VOTED TO TABLE.]

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