Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy
On
Colombia
Senate Floor
March 5, 2009
MR. LEAHY.
The abuses perpetrated against civilians by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, popularly known as the FARC, are too numerous
to list. From kidnappings to
bombings, torture and summary executions, the FARC have lost whatever
credibility and popular support they may once have had.
They are a criminal enterprise, despised by the vast majority of
Colombians, funded with proceeds from the production and sale of
cocaine, who show no respect for the laws of armed conflict.
The FARC have
kidnapped hundreds of people, many of whom remain in their custody,
their health and welfare unknown.
From what we have learned from the few who have escaped or been
released, they suffer severe hardship and deprivation.
The FARC have also
targeted Colombia’s
vulnerable indigenous people, whose traditional lands are often located
in conflict zones. They have
also been victimized by other armed groups, including the Colombian
army.
Two recent incidents illustrate the dangers these people face.
According to the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, on
February 11, 2009, the FARC killed 10 members of the Awá tribe in Nariño
department. This followed
the killing of 17 Awá on February 4, also in Nariño, and also reportedly
carried out by the FARC. There
are reports that an unknown number of Awá have been abducted.
The killing of defenseless indigenous civilians can best be described as
a crime against humanity. It
is utterly without justification, and those who engage in such
atrocities should pay for their crimes.
For years I have worked to help improve respect for human rights in Colombia and to strengthen Colombia’s
judicial system. I have also
supported efforts to protect the rights of Colombia’s indigenous people.
When we get reports of the FARC attacking and summarily executing
members of the Awá, including women and children, we are reminded how
much remains to be done to protect these vulnerable groups and before
real justice and peace can come to Colombia.
In recent years there
have been notable improvements in security in some parts of
Colombia, particularly Bogota, Medellin and other cities.
There has also been progress in expanding the presence of the
state into areas which previously had been ungoverned.
We are seeing some promising results from projects that provide
coca farmers with titles to land, technical assistance to grow licit
crops like coffee and cacao, and access to markets, in return for
voluntarily stopping growing coca. These
projects deserve our continued support.
But many rural areas
remain conflicted or controlled by the FARC or other armed groups, some
of whose members are demobilized paramilitaries.
After more than $7 billion in U.S.
aid and eight years since the beginning of Plan Colombia, the amount of coca under
cultivation is close to what it was before.
It is now grown in smaller, more isolated plots, in many more
parts of the country. More than
200,000 rural Colombians were displaced from their homes as a result of
drug related violence last year alone.
Another issue that
requires the attention of the Colombian Government is reparations for
victims of the conflict.
There are tens of thousands of people who had members of their families
killed or injured by paramilitaries, the FARC, or the army.
Many had land or other property stolen by paramilitaries who
often had the active or tacit support of the army.
The Colombian Government established mechanisms for returning
stolen assets, but for the most part it has not yet happened.
Very little of the land has been returned to its previous
occupants. This process
needs to be urgently invigorated if reconciliation is to succeed in Colombia.
Whether a family
member was killed or their property stolen by the FARC, paramilitaries,
or members of the army, the loss is the same.
The judicial process in Colombia is
wholly incapable of adjudicating the large number of cases or claims.
It is critical that, as was finally done in the
U.S.
when Congress appropriated funds to compensate victims of the Japanese
internment camps during World War Two, the Colombian Government take the
necessary steps to provide reparations for the victims so they can
rebuild their lives.
The issue of
extra-judicial killings, or “false positives” as they have been called,
is another major concern.
Human rights groups warned repeatedly that Colombian soldiers were
luring poor young men with the promise of jobs, summarily executing them
and then dressing the bodies to appear as FARC combatants in order to
obtain higher pay, time off, promotions, or other benefits.
I also expressed concern about this.
Instead of investigating, top Colombian officials, including the
President, responded by accusing the human rights groups of being FARC
sympathizers. After the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed these crimes and it was
revealed that they were the result of official army policy, the
government acknowledged the problem but the verbal attacks against human
rights defenders and journalists who wrote articles about the issue have
continued.
To his credit, the
Minister of Defense has taken some steps to address it, including
issuing decrees disavowing the policy of rewarding body counts and
dismissing army officers who were implicated in some cases.
But few if any have been prosecuted and punished, and there are
reportedly hundreds of these cases.
Throughout this
period, despite report after report that these atrocities were
occurring, former Secretary of State Rice continued to certify that the
Colombian army was meeting the human rights conditions in
U.S.
law. That was as shameful as
the Colombian Government blaming human rights defenders.
The Congress had no responsible alternative to withholding a
portion of the military aid for Colombia.
Whether or when those funds are released will depend, in part, on
how thoroughly the government addresses the problem of false positives,
whether the officers involved are held accountable, and whether those
who had the courage to report these crimes continue to be the target of
government attacks.
I also want to
mention the recently appointed Army Chief of Staff, General
González Peña, who replaced General Montoya.
General Montoya resigned under pressure due to the false
positives scandal and was “punished”, as too often occurs in Colombia, by being appointed an
ambassador. Not long ago,
General González Peña commanded the 4th Brigade in Antioquia
which has one of the worst rates of reported extra-judicial killings.
It is difficult to believe that he was unaware of what his troops
were reportedly doing, and it raises a concern about his qualifications
for such an important position.
This year, the
Appropriations Committee will again review our aid programs in Colombia.
We want to continue helping Colombia because we share many interests – in
addition to stopping the traffic in illegal drugs to the U.S. which has not succeeded to the
extent some had predicted.
We need to determine what has worked and deserves continued
U.S.
support, whether the Colombian Government is meeting the conditions in
U.S. law, and what costs should be shifted to the Colombian Government
as U.S. aid is ratcheted down in the coming years.
# # # # #
